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BOOK REVIEW
And to the Empire for Which It Stands: The Clearsighted
Revisionism of James G. Wilson's The Imperial Republic.
Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002.
Pp. 273. Hard Cover. $ 89.95.
Re vewed byJames T. Erickson*
You will be emancipated from tyranny and oppression,
and restored to the dignified station of freemen... The
United States offer you peace, liberty, and security,-your
choice lies between these and war, slavery, or destruction.
- General Hull's proclamation to the Canadians, de-
livered shortly before he led the United States' inva-
sion of Canada in 1812'
[I]t is doubtful if Congress would ever assent to the an-
nexation of territory upon the condition that its inhabi-
tants ... shall become at once citizens of the United
States .... It is obvious that in the annexation of outlying
and distant possessions grave questions will arise from
differences of race, habits, laws and customs of the peo-
ple.., which may require action on the part of Congress
that would be quite unnecessary in the annexation of con-
tiguous territory inhabited only by people of the same
race, or by scattered bodies of native Indians.
- Justice Henry B. Brown, writing for the majority
in Downes v. Bidwell (referring to the 1899 cession of
Puerto Rico-and impliedly of the Philippines, Cuba,
and Guam-to the United States following the Span-
ish-American Warf
* Book Review and Ethics Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 44.
J.D. candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., Hampshire College.
1. JAMES G. WILSON, THE IMPERIAL REPUBLIC: A STRUCTURAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE BEGINNING OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 127-28 (citing HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JAMES MADISON
503 (1986) (1891)).
2. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279-80, 282 (1901) (quoted in WILSON,
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One "contiguous territory" the United States never did
manage to "emancipate from tyranny and oppression" is Can-
ada, though not for want of trying. In 1775, before the United
States had become the United States, the Continental Con-
gress authorized the first invasion of Canada.3 The second
invasion came a year later.4 The third followed in 1812.5 As
late as 1860, presidential candidate and future Secretary of
State William H. Seward informed the no doubt bemused Ca-
nadians that "you are building excellent states to be hereafter
admitted into the American Union."' When the Canadians
ignored the offer, Seward looked further north. To this day,
his folly saves Americans many a penny at the pumps.
Seward, of course, bought rather than conquered Alaska.
The distinction may not have been so clear-cut to the Alas-
kans-certainly it was not to the inhabitants of the Louisiana
Territory after President Jefferson unconstitutionally made
his deal with the Emperor Napoleon.8 Acting more like an
emperor than a President, Jefferson appointed a governor
and created "The Assembly of Notables" to rule Napoleon's
surrendered subjects, all without their consent much less rep-
resentation.' During the debate over the purchase, Jeffer-
son's supporter John Randolph asserted that the United
States had the right to annex not merely Louisiana but-why
not?-Texas, Mexico, and South America, too.'0
As Professor James G. Wilson points out in The Imperial
Republic, Jefferson, the champion of Republicanism, thus
created in the Louisiana Territory a "completely nonrepubli-
can mode of government."" Wilson explains that
Jefferson's cherished belief in equal, republican govern-
supra note 1, at 250-51) (paragraph break omitted).
3. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 38.
4. See id. at 39.
5. See id. at 127.
6. See id. at 238 (citing WALTER LAFEBER, THE NEW EMPIRE: AN
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN EXPANSION 1860-1898, 28 (1963)).
7. See id. Seward arranged for the purchase of Alaska from Russia, an act
his critics referred to as "Seward's folly." See id. at 239.
8. See id. at 104, 106.
9. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 105 (citing JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN
SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 210 (2001)).
10. See id. at 104 (citing HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 368 (1986)
(1889-90) [hereinafter ADAMS ON JEFFERSON]).
11. Seeid. at 105.
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ments throughout an empire, a position he and [Benjamin]
Franklin had turned into the major constitutional premise
justifying the American Revolution, was sacrificed to his
desire to expand Westward and his fear of non-Anglicans.
The fundamental doctrine of taxation without representa-
tion could be delayed until a region became sufficiently
"homogenous," that is, until Anglo-Americans had sup-
planted Creoles as the majority in the new Territory. The
American Revolutionary model was altered, at least for
several years, into the Athenian-Anglican system of dou-
ble standards for different parts of an empire, a system
premised upon assumptions of racial and ethnic superior-
ity.1
2
Here, the use of the noun "empire" may seem presump-
tuous. Canada, Alaska, the Louisiana Territory, Puerto Rico,
and the Philippines-could not these index-entries in the
book of American history be referenced without any mention
of "empire"? And if mentioned, whose definition of "empire" is
to apply to the three invasions of Canada? Or to the uncon-
stitutional purchase of the Louisiana Territory and concomi-
tant creation of a "completely nonrepublican mode of govern-
ment" there? Or to Seward's folly? Or to the 1898-1902 U.S.
invasion of the Philippines and slaughter of hundreds of
thousands of Filipinos?"3 "Empire" means one thing in one
context, something else in another-and its modern sense
may not apply to long-past events at all.'
4
Nervous academics fret over such semantic issues. Yet in
some contexts it seems bizarre that anyone would debate the
definition of the word "empire." For example, shortly after
the United States became the most powerful nation on earth,
the United Fruit Company was threatened by the 1951 elec-
tion of Jacobo Arbenz to the Presidency of Guatemala.'
5
12. Id. at 105-06.
13. The most common estimate for war-related Filipino deaths is 250,000.
Acknowledging this estimate, Filipino scholar Luzviminda Francisco suggests
that the actual number of deaths may have exceeded one million. See Luz-
viminda Francisco, The First Vietnam: The Philippines-America War, 1899-
1902, in DANIEL B. SCHIRMER & STEPHEN ROssKAUM SHALOM, THE
PHILIPPINES READER: A HISTORY OF COLONIALISM, NEOCOLONIALISM,
DICTATORSHIP, AND RESISTANCE 19 (1987).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 19, 24.
15. See STEPHEN SCHLESINGER & STEPHEN KINZER, BITTER FRUIT: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF THE AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA 74-75 (1982) (citing
THOMAS & MARJORIE MELVILLE, GUALEMALA: THE POLITICS OF LAND
OWNERSHIP 50 (1971)).
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United Fruit was in a position to protect its banana interests
in Central America via the executive branch of the United
States government: John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles, two
men with strong ties to the company, were respectively Presi-
dent Eisenhower's Secretary of State and Director of Central
Intelligence.' 6 Thanks to the CIA's "Operation Success," Ar-
benz was overthrown.'7 Guatemala was ruled during the sub-
sequent decades by a military dictatorship, culminating in
the "slaughter of over one hundred thousand Indian peas-
ants"-a slaughter "aided and abetted" by the United States
in the 1980s and 1990s. 8
To some, this hegemonic intervention amounts to a pretty
clear-cut example of imperialism. But in the politicized world
of American academia, little may ever be clear-cut. Anticipat-
ing his critics, Wilson provides at least four different defini-
tions of "empire" (analytic/descriptive, empirical, emotive, and
normative), each with its own sub-definitions.19 The over-
throw of the Guatemalan government and installation of a
puppet regime would fall into the category of the "emotive
definition" Wilson borrows from Michael Doyle: 'Empire...
is a system of interaction between two political entities, one of
which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over
the internal and external policy-the effective sovereignty-of
the other, the subordinate periphery.""'2 Though not perfect,
this definition is close enough for government work, or at
least for the Eisenhower government's work in Guatemala.
Why is this quibbling over words even necessary? One
reason, as Richard W. Van Alstyne mentioned in The Rising
American Empire, is that "[I]n the United States it is almost
a heresy to describe the nation as an empire. [But] the foun-
ders so regarded it."" Written more than four decades ago,
this statement remains cogent in its use of the word "heresy."
Clifford Angell Bates, Jr., in a review of The Imperial Repub-
lic written for the Law and Courts section of the American
Political Science Association, opines that Wilson's work "re-
16. See id. at 76, 106.
17. See id. at xiii.
18. See id. at 254-55; WILSON, supra note 1, at 255.
19. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 16-20.
20. See id. at 18-19 (citing MICHAEL W. DOYLE, EMPIRES 12 (1986)).
21. See id. at 7 (citing RICHARD W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE RISING AMERICAN
EMPIRE 6 (1960)).
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flects the new-fangled Marxism that emerged after the intel-
lectual collapse of the Soviet Block"; worse, it has a "shrill
and moralizing tone."2 Here, once you get past the weirdly
anachronistic red-baiting, the key buzzword is "shrill." In the
fair and balanced era of Fox News, any time a scholar re-
minds his readers of Guatemala or the Philippines or the
treatment of Native Americans, he is sure to be described as
"shrill" by critics weary of the truth. Once mentioned, by
anyone anywhere, the uglier simple truths of American his-
tory are deemed to have been sufficiently discussed, and are
henceforth to be either ignored (silence is never "shrill") or ra-
tionalized-though one can hardly imagine a Canadian histo-
rian viewing sympathetically the United States' three inva-
sions of her native land, no matter how attractive our
splendid health care system may be.
But Van Alstyne's point brings up another issue, one
treated with as little objectivity by Bates as the "new-fangled
Marxist" application of the word "empire" to the United
States: the founders themselves regarded their invention as
an "empire."23 Correspondingly, Wilson emphasizes to the
point of redundancy that the word "empire" has had different
connotations for different people at different times.24 Later,
perhaps overdoing it, he predicts that "the very charge that
will be made against this book" is that he is "applying [his]
conceptions of 'empire' depending upon [his] underlying po-
litical preferences."25 But when dealing with heresy, such ef-
forts are to no avail: Bates-who, in his excitement about the
intellectual collapse of the Soviet Block, seems not to have
read past page twelve of the book 26-takes Wilson to task "for
trying to convince the reader that when people like [Alexan-
der] Hamilton, Franklin, [John] Marshall, and others, speak
of 'empire' their understanding of the term coincides with his
own."27 Running out of pejorative compound nouns, Bates
claims again that "Wilson's structural approach arbitrarily
22. See Clifford Angell Bates, Jr., Book Review, 13 L. & POL. BOOK REV. 10,
'1 1-2 (Jan. 2003), at
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/wilson-james.htm.
23. See supra text accompanying note 21.
24. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 1, at 12.
25. See id. at 202-03.
26. Bates quotes repeatedly from the first twelve pages, once from pages
fifty to fifty-one, never from any other page.
27. See Bates, supra note 22, 6.
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imposes a new-fangled Marxism with its understanding" of
the terms "republican," "empire," and "liberty."28
In fact, as described, Wilson goes to some length to pro-
vide alternative definitions for the book's key terms.29 Having
done so, he then gathers dozens of examples of the terms' use
by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American politicians.
This encourages the reader to determine independently what
the words meant at the time they were spoken or written.
I. THE NASCENT AMERICAN "EMPIRE"
With the relativism of the word "empire" in mind, it is
well to remember that at the founding of the United States
the nation's territory encompassed the thirteen colonies and
not much else.3" Meanwhile, England, France, and Spain
(and, later, Mexico and Russia) had competing interests in
the rest of North America, while untold numbers of Native
Americans had different ideas altogether."
Within seventy years, the United States controlled all but
a small southwestern strip of its present North American con-
tiguous land mass." This did not happen by accident. As
Wilson describes with ample documentation, "the majority of
[early] American leaders and average Americans consistently
and strongly committed themselves to an exhilarating expan-
sion of their nation."3 In short, Wilson's thesis is that "Em-
pire building has consistently been a major force in the devel-
opment of America's legal and political constitutions."34
Such a simple thesis, verging on the self-evident, would
likely not be regarded as a "hot button" notion anywhere out-
side our nation's borders. At home, though, it is another
story. As Wilson reminds us: "In the Twentieth Century, it
became impolitic to refer to America as an 'empire."'' The
word "empire," in other words, is politically incorrect-at
least when applied to the United States. Clifford Angell
28. See id.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 19, 24.
30. The Proclamation Line of 1763 established the boundaries beyond which
the colonists were forbidden to settle. See Paul C. Bowers, The American Revo-
lution, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 716 (1998).
31. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 1, at 71-72, 74-75, 137, 193.
32. See id. at 197.
33. Id. at 7.
34. Id. at 11.
35. Id. at 253.
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Bates' review has been emphasized above to illustrate what
Wilson and other clearsighted revisionists are up against in
employing such an "impolitic" term. But revisionism is nec-
essary when the vision being supplanted is at best myopic
and at worst blindfolded.
It becomes clear from Wilson's research that early Ameri-
can politicians used the word "empire" in two predominant
senses. First, "empire" was often no more than a synonym for
"a large territory under one government's control."36 Thus,
the United States, England, France, and Spain all had "em-
pires" on the American continent. But "empire" was also used
to describe a state intent upon expansion. Because expan-
sion could occur by treaty, purchase, or conquest, "empire"
could describe both peaceful and violently aggressive states.
However one defines "empire," Wilson convincingly dem-
onstrates that early exponents of America's "empire" fre-
quently had expansion on their minds.38 Those who opposed
expansion, such as some of the anti-federalists, usually did so
not on principle but because they considered it dangerous to
their own interests.39 Throughout the book, therefore, Wilson
makes a motif of James Madison's oft-noted comparison of the
capacities of "large" and "small" states to sustain a republican
government; ° Madison, thereby, may be used as a touchstone
for the views of others. In Federalist Ten, Madison argued
that "large republics were preferable to small republics...
because there would be so many groups and interests that the
majority could never coalesce into a tyrannical faction."" Ap-
parently taking America's substantial expansion for granted,
Madison followed up in Federalist Sixty-three by contending
that republican representation is an "advantage" whose "full
effect" can be realized only if "we [are] careful not to separate
it from the other advantage, of an extensive territory."42 From
this argument, Wilson concludes that Madison believed "re-
publican governments had no alternative to being of great
36. See id. at 12-13.
37. SeeWILSON, supra note 1, at 12-13.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 40-70.
39. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 1, at 29.
40. See, e.g., id. at 29-30, 33.
41. Id. at 29-30 (paraphrasing THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83-84 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossitor ed., 1961)).
42. See id. at 33 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 387 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossitor ed., 1961)).
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size.... Republicans have no choice but to pursue and pro-
tect empire."43
At the very least Madison was representative of his am-
bitious Virginian countrymen: "All the [Revolutionary] Vir-
ginians who would later become President-Washington, Jef-
ferson, Madison, and Monroe-sought to expand the country,
particularly westward. 44 While President, Jefferson dreamed
of the day when (as he put it in a letter to James Monroe)
"our rapid multiplication will expand itself... & cover the
whole northern, if not the southern continent, with a people
speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, & by
similar laws. 45
As for Madison's Federalist collaborator and Jefferson's
great rival,46 Alexander Hamilton "became the equivalent of a
Prime Minister within Washington's first cabinet, [and] did
everything he could to guarantee that the Presidency...
would have the 'energy' to facilitate the growth of empire."47
This "growth of empire," as mentioned, involved acquir-
ing lands not only from England, France, Spain, and eventu-
ally Russia and Mexico, but also from a great many Native
Americans. Regarding the last, Wilson writes: "Every treaty
violation was a form of conquest. A large part of the expand-
ing American empire was gained in the traditional imperial
fashion: massacres, skirmishes, and battles."48 All too easily,
historians may forget that the gradual absorption of indige-
nous peoples' lands was every bit as "imperial" as would have
been, say, invading and conquering Canada. Yet this promi-
nent aspect of American expansion is rarely conceived as the
act of an empire. Instead, it often seems to be merely-or, as
it were, manifestly-the work of destiny.
In his "shrill and moralizing" references to Native Ameri-
cans, Wilson underscores the essential fact that empire-
building was a preoccupation not just of American leaders but
of the forgotten American citizens who pushed westward.49
43. Id. at 33.
44. Id. at 40.
45. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 41 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
the Governor of Virginia [James Monroe] (Nov. 24, 1801), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1097 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984)).
46. See id. at 94.
47. Id. at 43.
48. Id. at 45.
49. See id.
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After all, the aggressive Generals Jackson, Harrison, and
Taylor won the popular vote in five of the seven presidential
elections between 1824 and 1848, strongly suggesting wide-
spread approval of the expansionist aims these military lead-
ers represented; ° indeed, "widespread" may be an under-
statement, considering that the other two elections were won
by James Polk, who ran on a frankly militaristic platform,51
and by Jackson's Vice President, Martin Van Buren.52
Whereas the Generals' predecessor President Jefferson had
strategized to purchase Native American land as cheaply as
possible, 3 "a large segment of the American public ... used
whatever force and fraud necessary to drive the Native
Americans further West."54 As the great American historian
Henry Adams put it: "From Lake Erie to Florida, in long, un-
broken line, pioneers were at work, cutting into the forests
with the energy of so many beavers, and with no more ex-
press moral purpose than the beavers they drove away."55
According to Wilson, "Jefferson continually encouraged"
the "relentless pressure of the average Western settler"5 6 -not
only as a means of dealing with the Native American popula-
tion but also as a geopolitical strategy: "Jefferson knew that
the steady increase in well-armed settlers was America's
guarantee of ultimate success. Over the coming decades,
none of the European countries could resist that combination
of demographic, economic, and military force."57 Indeed, Jef-
ferson's authorization of Lewis and Clark's "survey" of the
continent was, Wilson writes, "part of his plan to eventually
extend the United States' sovereignty to the Pacific Ocean."58
50. See id. at 198. John Quincy Adams was elected President in 1824, but
Jackson won the popular vote.
51. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 197.
52. See id. at 189.
53. Jefferson imagined that the Native Americans, being hemmed in by
white settlements and forbidden to sell to anyone but the United States, would
be obliged in farming smaller plots to purchase equipment, go into debt, sell
more land to cover the debt, and so on. See id. at 44-45 (citing Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Governor William H. Harrison (Feb. 27, 1803), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 45, at 1118). Should this non-violent plan
fail, Jefferson added, "we have only to shut our hand to crush them." See id.
54. See id. at 45.
55. Id. at 99 (citing ADAMS ON JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 121).
56. Id.
57. WILSON, supra note 1, at 99.
58. Id. at 104 (citing ADAMS ON JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 527).
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Meanwhile, Jefferson combined threats of force with dip-
lomatic maneuvering to facilitate additional expansion.59 The
Louisiana Purchase explicitly excluded the Floridas, which
Spain, not France, controlled." Jefferson nevertheless de-
manded the Floridas,1 though he also claimed that Spain's
"existence on this hemisphere and ours should have rested on
the same bottom .... We want nothing of hers." 2  A few
months later Jefferson informed the British that the United
States, upon strengthening its navy, would be in a position to
conquer not just the Floridas but Cuba as well. 3
Although Jefferson's ambitions in the Floridas and Cuba
were frustrated (the first invasion of Florida was delayed un-
til the administration of his successor, James Madison;' the
invasions of Cuba were delayed until the administrations of
McKinley65 and Kennedy6 ), a French envoy described Jeffer-
son as threatening to "take Canada" and "have the Flori-
das;"67 and in a letter to the American minister to Spain, the
President wrote, "We ask but one month to be in possession of
the city of Mexico."' Given such a vision on the part of so
prominent a founder, it is unsurprising that Alexis de Toc-
queville would later describe America as "the most grasping
nation on the globe," 9 a place where "the rapacity of the set-
59. Seeid. at 110-16.
60. See id. at 111 (citing ADAMS ON JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 331).
61. See id.
62. See id. at 113 (citing ADAMS ON JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 641). Ad-
ams expressed skepticism about Jefferson's sincerity, pointing out that "for
eighteen months he had exhausted every resource, short of force, to gain Baton
Rouge, Mobile, and Pensacola, not to speak of East Florida and Texas." See
ADAMS, supra note 10, at 641-42 (not quoted by Wilson).
63. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 113 (citing ADAMS ON JEFFERSON, supra
note 10, at 673).
64. Seeid. at 119.
65. See David D. Burks, Cuba, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 302 (1998).
66. See id. at 304.
67. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 115 (citing ADAMS ON JEFFERSON, supra
note 10, at 952). The envoy was General Turreau, whom Napoleon had ap-
pointed minister to the United States in 1804. See ADAMS ON JEFFERSON, su-
pra note 10, at 483, 952.
68. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 115 (citing ADAMS ON JEFFERSON, supra
note 10, at 904). Wilson substitutes "Mexico City" for "the city of Mexico"-the
words Jefferson used-but does not bracket the change. See id.; ADAMS ON
JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 904. Adams argued that Jefferson was being hy-
perbolic. See ADAMS ON JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 904 (not noted by Wil-
son).
69. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 347 (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 369 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945) (1835)).
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tlers [toward Native Americans] is usually backed by the tyr-
anny of the government.""
II. THE AGE OF JACKSON AND BEYOND
De Tocqueville visited America during the Jacksonian
Era," a period whose dominant attitudes seem, in Wilson's
chronology, to have been the inevitable progeny of the expan-
sionism preceding them. In the wake of the Monroe Doctrine,
a definitive statement of jealous imperial sovereignty, 2 Amer-
ica underwent a "wave of religious enthusiasm" which "pro-
vided another justification of expansion: Americans had an
obligation not just to civilize Native Americans, but also
to ... spread righteous Christianity throughout the hemi-
sphere." 3 Wilson sums up the result in a simple formula:
"the 'divine right of kings' became the 'divine right of Ameri-
cans."'74 In this milieu Andrew Jackson's star rose. 5
Jackson was the hero of the Battle of New Orleans, a
needless encounter that occurred soon after the War of 1812
had ostensibly ended." His emergence as a national figure in
that War is all the more striking, historically, given that the
War had "radically changed [the nation's] internal political
culture and relevant constitutional practices, accelerating the
transition from nonaggression to militarism, from provincial-
ism to nationalism."" In turn, Jackson's 1828 presidential
victory "signified ... the triumph of a more militaristic, rac-
ist, and aggressive conception of the Constitution."78 Again
emphasizing that expansionist impulses lurked in every stra-
tum of society, Wilson notes, "Jackson's widespread support,
which lasted beyond his death, is a grim reminder that many
of the United States' most appalling traits are attributable
not just to the country's ruling class, but also its citizenry." 9
70. See id. (citing TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 69, at 350).
71. De Tocqueville visited the United States in 1831-32. See Phillips Brad-
ley, Introduction, in TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 69, at viii.
72. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 40-41; see also VAN ALSTYNE, supra note
21, at 98-99.
73. WILSON, supra note 1, at 117.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 132.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 143.
79. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 143.
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During Jackson's second term, the large-scale immigra-
tion of Americans to Texas led to the declaration of Texas'in-
dependence from Mexico, whose land had been seized (re-
member the Alamo?) by those now creating a Republic upon
it.8" Jackson, a compatriot of Sam Houston, immediately rec-
ognized the new nation,8 and within a decade Texas was an-
nexed by virtue of majority vote of Congress.82 That is,
Americans seized land from Mexico without the explicit par-
ticipation of the United States government; but the govern-
ment soon cooperated by annexing the land without benefit of
treaty with Mexico nor consent of the Mexican inhabitants."
To a greater extent than ever before, prominent Ameri-
cans strongly opposed the expansion;84 but as had been the
case with the few anti-federalists who opposed a "large" re-
public at the founding, the argument against expansion actu-
ally centered upon different issues. In this case, those issues
were slavery and the governance of territories.8 Both North-
erners and Southerners were included among those opposing
annexation, though based on different theories (beyond our
present scope) of its probable effects.86
Shortly before Congress settled the question of annexa-
tion, American "voters turned the 1844 Presidential election
into a mandate for continued expansion."87 Democratic candi-
date James Polk called for the "reannexation" [sic] of Texas
and the "reoccupation" of Oregon, and generally advocated
quick expansion to the Pacific.88 Moreover, as many of us
learned to our bewilderment in high school, Polk's slogan was
"Fifty-four forty or fight"8 (happily, yet another unfulfilled
campaign promise). Polk was elected. However, the com-
bined Northern vote of Liberty Party candidate James K.
Birney and Whig candidate Henry Clay, the former opposing
expansion and the latter lukewarm towards it, exceeded
80. See id. at 144.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 195-96.
83. See id. at 194-96.
84. See id. at 192-99.
85. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 192-99.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 194.
88. See id. at 195.
89. See id. at 197. The slogan referred to the line of geographic latitude (in
Canada) Polk proposed as the northernmost point of contemporary American
expansion. Id.
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Polk's Northern vote by almost 50,000.90 Noting this, Wilson
points out that "[d]uring certain moments of American his-
tory, many citizens, well represented by powerful leaders,
have opposed a particular expansion, formal or informal, of
the empire. But one of the interesting patterns in American
history is how often the anti-imperial advocates lost."9"
President Polk proceeded to go to war with Mexico after
the Mexicans turned down his generous offer of five million
dollars for New Mexico and twenty-five million for Califor-
nia.92 The crafty commander in chief ordered the United
States Army (led by General Zachary Taylor) to occupy a con-
tested region never formally controlled by Texas;9 when the
Mexicans defended the region, Polk protested that they "had
invaded our territory and shed American blood on American
soil."'
And the war, or at least a war, or one of the wars, came.
Forty years after Jefferson's proud boast to the French,9" the
United States at last "seized" Mexico City-not to mention
California.96 After obliging certain dubiously representative
Mexicans to sell the latter, the United States relinquished the
former"7.. .over the protests of the southern "all Mexico"
movement."
III. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL AND EMPIRE
Famously, the United States was conceived as a nation
ruled by laws, not men." As an unusually litigious and
lawyerly nation,100 one where the rule of law would, ideally, be
supreme over any competing "rule," the United States cannot
be comprehended historically without paying due respect to
90. See id. at 195.
91. WILSON, supra note 1, at 195.
92. See id. at 197.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 197-98.
95. See id.; text accompanying note 68.
96. See id. at 198.
97. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 198.
98. See id. at 199.
99. The phrase is usually attributed to John Adams, who in 1776 wrote: "the
very definition of a republic is 'an empire of laws, and not of men."' PAGE
SMITH, 1 JOHN ADAMS 246 (1962).
100. The United States leads the nations of the world in lawyers per capita.
See, e.g., Sara Terry, Has US. Become a Nation of Finger-Pointers, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 20, 1999, at 9.
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its legal history. Professor Wilson appropriately devotes a
large share of his book to analyzing the role of the Supreme
Court in the great expansion of the nineteenth century.'0 '
The Marshall Court is the subject of much of this atten-
tion, but Wilson's focus on Marshall differs from his general
legal focus in that he uses Marshall to pursue a special goal:
he attempts "to test the imperial ambition thesis" by "ap-
ply[ing] it to a high-quality, contemporary work of legal his-
tory,"' °' G. Edward White's The Marshall Court & Cultural
Change 1815_1835.103 In The Marshall Court, the author lists
the "premises" that were shared by Chief Justice Marshall
and his Republican opponents: "America was a republic;
property rights were to be protected; commerce was to be en-
couraged; liberty and virtue were to be furthered; sovereignty
was to be divided among the respective spheres of influ-
ence."'
0 4
In response, Wilson notes that White "did not include as
a 'starting premise' the equally universal commitment to the
growth of the republican empire. Instead, he emphasized the
country's expansion as one of the major forces of 'cultural
change,' an external, background pressure on the existing le-
gal system."' In other words, the Marshall Court was some-
times more pro-active than reactive in the quest for expan-
sion.
Wilson goes on to delineate the contribution of the judi-
cial branch to empire-building, a contribution easily ignored
in the standard analysis of black-letter law.' 6 To begin with,
"The Marshall Court's jurisprudence constitutionalized a par-
ticular ideological/political tradition, the imperial vision of
Alexander Hamilton." 7 Wilson thus brings a novel perspec-
tive to several of the Marshall Court's most celebrated cases.
Consider the following:
By stating in Marbury v Madisonl8 that most foreign af-
101. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 147-85, 207-52.
102. See id. at 147.
103. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT & CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-
1835 (1991).
104. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 149 (citing WHITE, supra note 103, at 52-
53).
105. Id. at 149.
106. See, e.g., id. at 149-50.
107. See id. at 150 (emphasis added).
108. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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fairs questions were judicially unreviewable "political" de-
cisions, [Marshall] allocated responsibility for the imple-
mentation of foreign affairs and the war power to the two
elected branches. In those areas, the politicians would be
primarily constrained by their consciences and the elec-
torate. Thus Marshall helped create a Machiavellian re-
public, in which the rule of law would apply internally, but
not externally. He also implemented [contemporary histo-
rian] David Ramsay's vision of a republic headed by an
emperor-like figure who had vast discretion over foreign
policy. 09
This, to put it mildly, is not the Marbury spin found in
most textbooks. And as for constitutionalizing "the imperial
vision of Alexander Hamilton," Wilson has this to say about
Marshall's treatment of Hamilton's creation, the Bank of the
United States:
In the course of upholding the constitutionality of the
bank in McCuioch v. Maryland,110 Marshall explicitly in-
cluded the bank within his imperial vision that extended
far beyond the country's existing boundaries at the Mis-
sissippi River: "Throughout this vast republic, from the St.
Croix to the Gulf of Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pa-
cific, revenue is to be collected and expended, armies are
to be marched and supported." By validating the right of
the federal government to create corporations, immuniz-
ing federal corporations from state harassment, fleshing
out the "universal law" of corporations in a variety of State
"contract" cases, and implying numerous important rights,
Marshall created a blueprint for a powerful institution
that governments could use in any way they saw fit."'
To support his thesis, Wilson describes what Marshall
was up to in the aftermath of the empire-building the Court
had endorsed. In American Insurance Co. v. Canter,"' a Flor-
ida-centered case decided a decade after Florida was ac-
quired,"' Marshall "aggressively implied extensive federal
109. WILSON, supra note 1, at 159-60 (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166) (cita-
tions omitted).
110. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
111. WILSON, supra note 1, at 181 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 408 (altera-
tion in original)) (citations omitted).
112. Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511 (1828) [hereinafter Can-
ter].
113. Spain gave up title to both Floridas in 1819. See WILSON, supra note 1,
at 136.
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powers from a mixture of text and general principles; the Un-
ion's powers of making wars and treaties and 'the usage of the
world' implied the derivative power to acquire additional
land, 'either by conquest or by treaty.' 4
Canter arose after a Florida territorial court ordered the
cargo of a wrecked ship sold to reimburse the ship's salvors."5
Marshall ruled that the territorial legislature, established by
Congress, was competent to establish the territorial court."'
The fact that the territorial court heard cases in admiralty
did not make it an "Article Three" court, because such an Ar-
ticle Three limitation "does not extend to the territories. In
legislating for them, congress exercises the combined powers
of the general, and of a state government."" 7 The last sen-
tence, with no more than a handful of words, creates in Con-
gress powers crucial to the administration of an empire."8
Canter is not among the cases now forming the tradi-
tional, textbook canon."9 Wilson's wholly relevant attention
to such a case exemplifies the value of his thesis in bringing
to bear any vision at all, much less a "revision," to the Court's
contributions to empire. As Wilson puts his own case, "The
central importance of Canter, which Professor White consid-
ered only for its jurisdictional implications, reconfirms the
utility of emphasizing the role of empire in constitutional ide-
ology."
20
114. Id. at 160 (quoting Canter, 26 U.S. at 542).
115. See Canter, 26 U.S. at 541.
116. See id. at 546.
117. See id. In pertinent part, Article Three provides: "The judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.... The ju-
dicial Power shall extend.., to all Cases of admiralty...." U.S. CONST. art.
III, §§ 1-2. The court at issue in Canter was created by a territorial legislature,
leading to the question of whether a territorial court had jurisdiction in "Cases
of admiralty" arising in the territory. Marshall answered:
The jurisdiction with which [the territorial courts] are invested, is not a
part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the Con-
stitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those gen-
eral powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United
States.
Canter, 26 U.S. at 546.
118. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 162.
119. See id.
120. Id.
Vol: 44
BOOK REVIEW
IV. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL
COMPLEX
It is not too much of a stretch to locate in Marbury,
McCuioch, and Canter the legal ground from which would
grow "another institution.., that would effectively extend
imperial power without needing to expand territorial sover-
eignty: the modern multi-national corporation." '121 After the
Civil War,
American corporations helped formulate foreign policy in
Washington and domestic policy throughout the Americas.
These increasingly powerful corporations worked closely
with the government to further both military and eco-
nomic expansion. As early as the mid-1880s, (former sec-
retary to Lincoln and future Secretary of State] John
Hay... lamented: "This... is a government of corpora-
tions, by corporations, and for corporations.. ." The... al-
liance between government, the military, military contrac-
tors, and private power became ever tighter by the end on
[sic] the Nineteenth Century, culminating in the Spanish-
American War.
1 22
The Civil War itself contributed to this development:
"When the war ended, the opportunity for a vast empire had
never been brighter. The North had created a military-
industrial complex, combining the brute force of military
power with the flexible, aggressive productive capacities of
the modern corporation, a system which would help lead to
American eventual worldwide supremacy.'2 3 Inevitably, this
had an effect on political theory and the terms of political dis-
course: "Some of the old Anti-Federalist arguments against
vast empires-areas distant from the center would be hard to
defend, regulate, and integrate-were undermined not so
much by theory, as by technology and the brutal art of mod-
ern warfare."' 4 Move forward a few decades and add the
shipping capacities of modern aircraft, and the contours of
twentieth-century neocolonialism are essentially defined.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to do justice to Wilson's nar-
121. See id. at 244.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 236.
124. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 237.
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rative of the years between the Mexican and the Spanish-
American Wars without overextensive quotation from the fi-
nal section of The Imperial Republic. For example, in exam-
ining the obvious entanglement of the questions of expansion
and slavery, Wilson quotes Frederick Jackson Turner's thesis
that the Civil War was "also a war for the possession of the
unoccupied West, a struggle between the Middle West and
the States of the Gulf Plains."12 Provocatively, Wilson adds:
"Turner argued that historians' emphasis on slavery obscured
the even greater importance of expansionism on the American
mind (just as the contemporary obsession with racial and
sexual injustices underemphasizes the country's relentless
quest for power)."'26
Wilson also gives compelling and unorthodox readings of
the infamous Dred Scot'27 decision and the "constitutional vi-
sion" of John C. Calhoun: "Just as Hamilton provided through
theory and practice the basic constitutional system that Jus-
tice Marshall eventually converted into constitutional law, so
Calhoun developed through words and deeds a conception of
empire that Justice Taney would temporarily imbed into the
legal constitution in Dred Scott."
12
More crucially, Wilson stresses that the otherwise repel-
lant Dred Scott decision held a small silver lining in declaring
that "Congress had no constitutional authority to maintain
perpetual colonies.' 19 Not only did this ruling effectively cre-
ate the limit on the modern geographical shape of the na-
tion, 30 it also transformed the manner in which the empire
was henceforth administered.' In combination with the citi-
125. See id. at 232 (quoting FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, The Middle West,
in THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 141 (1996)).
126. Id. at 241.
127. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
128. WILSON, supra note 1, at 207.
129. See id. at 217. Wilson paraphrases the decision in Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at
446, which held:
There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal
Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United
States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleas-
ure .... [N]o power is given to acquire a Territory to be held and gov-
erned permanently in that character.
Id.
130. See id. at 217, 220, 238.
131. Seeid. at 221-22.
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zenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,13 the prohibi-
tion against perpetual colonies created a system in which, as
Bertrand Russell put it, "annexation of territory has difficul-
ties under the American Constitution: it involves the admis-
sion of new voters, who may be thought undesirable."'3  A
typical result: "After the Cuban revolution [for independence
from Spain] ended in 1878, American citizens increased their
influence by buying up depressed sugar plantations.... In
1888, the North American Review concluded that this new,
informal 'species of ownership' provided profits without incur-
ring political obligations."'34 Similarly, in arguing against the
annexation of Hawaii after the Spanish-American War, Wil-
liam Graham Sumner put the neo-colonialist position suc-
cinctly:
What private individuals want is free access, under order
and security, to any part of the earth's surface, in order
they may avail themselves of its natural resources for
their use, either by investment or commerce. If, therefore,
we have free trade with Hawaii while somebody else has
the jurisdiction, we should gain all the advantages and es-
cape all the burdens."' 5
Wilson sums up the result of the Spanish-American War:
"America would have perpetual colonies. Native populations
in Puerto Rico and the Philippines would not be brought into
the Republic via 'compact and equality.' Particularly in the
Philippines, they would be subjugated through relentless vio-
lence and permanent inequality."'36 Meanwhile,
The American empire also slowed its geographical growth
because it devised other means for broadening its influ-
ence .... America facilitated its naval/commercial pres-
ence throughout the world by gaining control of many
strategic locations: Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Samoa,
132. See id. at 238. The citizenship clause provides: "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
133. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 217 n.34 (quoting BERTRAND RUSSELL,
POWER 111 (1995)). Wilson's bibliography does not give the full title of Russell's
book, which is POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS.
134. See id. at 240.
135. See id. at 242 (citing WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, The Fallacy of Territo-
ial Extension, in ON LIBERTY AND POLITICS, THE ESSENTIAL ESSAYS OF
WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER 269 (1992)).
136. Id. at 243.
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the Panama Canal, the Virgin Islands, Cuba, and the Phil-
ippines. The brutal subjugation of the Philippines demon-
strated that force and conquest remained integral parts of
American foreign policy. In addition to developing a for-
mal colonial system, American Presidents would engage in
"gunboat diplomacy." Periodic invasions of South Ameri-
can countries to maintain "stability" occurred throughout
the coming century. 1
37
Finally, Wilson rounds out his "re-vision" of the first half
of post-Revolutionary American history by focusing again on
legal history. After Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad Co.38 established that the "persons" granted rights
by the Fourteenth Amendment included corporations,'39 in the
Slaughter-House Cased ' Justice Miller listed among Four-
teenth Amendment rights the privilege "to demand the pro-
tection of the Federal government ... when on the high seas
or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government."' Consis-
tent with his book's theme, Wilson finds here that "[a]t long
last, Daniel Webster's preference of expanding American
power through private investment instead of territorial
growth received its constitutional imprimatur." "'
Unfortunately for the disciples of Webster, the portion of
Dred Scott forbidding perpetual colonies had been recon-
firmed after the Civil War in Reynolds v. United States."'
This created the "imperial difficulty" that Congress, while
creating administrative structures in new territories, could
not interfere with the constitutional rights of the residents of
these former "colonies.""' The Supreme Court solved this and
related difficulties in the Insular Cases.''
137. Id. at 243-44.
138. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
139. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 244. Technically, the Supreme Court held
that the case could be decided without reaching the constitutional question. See
Santa Clara County, 118 U.S. at 410. However, Justice Field's concurrence in
the decision's companion case makes clear what the resolution of the constitu-
tional question would have been, thus effectively establishing the Court's posi-
tion even if only in dicta. See San Bernardino County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118
U.S. 417, 422-23 (1886) (Field, J., concurring).
140. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
141. See id. at 79; WILSON, supra note 1, at 245.
142. WILSON, supra note 1, at 245.
143. 98 U.S. 145 (1878); see WILSON, supra note 1, at 247 (citing Reynolds, 98
U.S. at 162).
144. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 247.
145. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Dooley v. U.S., 182 U.S. 222
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Wilson pays particular attention to Downes v. Bidwell,'46
which he argues should "be pulled out of the collectivity of the
Insular Cases and considered on its own merits" because it is
"one of the most despicable Supreme Court opinions of all
time.""' In the first of the Insular Cases,'4' the Court created
a presumption in favor of free trade with a colony acquired by
treaty;14 in the second... it modified the presumption to allow
military expenses to be offset (prior to formal treaty ratifica-
tion) by pre-existing import duties."' Then in Downes, the
Court allowed tariffs on "imports" from Puerto Rico even if
such tariffs would have been unconstitutional within the
mainland."2  "Thus," Wilson explains, "the United States
could have it both ways with its new colonies: it could create
free trade zones whenever desirable, yet tax any of those
colonies' imports that threaten domestic interests.""' Mean-
while, the Court
quoted the Fourteenth Amendment as another authority
for imperialism .... Because the colonies were neither in
the United States nor States, their inhabitants had no
constitutional rights[, ... particularly the dreaded right
to be treated as a human being throughout the United
States under the Privileges and Immunities Clause....
The Court explicitly relied upon imperial necessity and ra-
cial difference to justify its peculiar doctrine that facili-
tated lucrative trade but little else. Whatever the Fram-
ers may have thought about republican empires, Congress
needed to have the same powers all other countries have
when they conquer a new land.... The majority...
imbedded racism into the American empire after the Four-
teenth Amendment as much as Taney imbedded race slav-
ery into the original Constitution."5
While the Fourteenth Amendment did "make it more dif-
ficult to fully assimilate [foreign] lands into the Republic," the
only lands formally taken (other than the Isthmus of Pa-
(1900); DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1900).
146. Downes, 182 U.S. 244.
147. WILSON, supra note 1, at 248.
148. DeLima, 182 U.S. 1.
149. Id. at 186-87; see WILSON, supra note 1, at 247-48.
150. Dooley, 182 U.S. 222.
151. Id. at 233; see also WILSON, supra note 1, at 248.
152. See WILSON, supra note 1, at 248.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 248-50 (paragraph divisions omitted).
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nama) were, as Wilson notes, islands "necessary for trade or
war."'55 As for larger countries, it was "easier and cheaper to
use military and economic force to keep [them] under indirect
control with the ruthless assistance of compliant local leader-
ship.
156
And there, at the entrance or perhaps open door to the
twentieth century, Wilson leaves his narrative. The rest is
not only history but also the present and the foreseeable fu-
ture. Appropriately, then, Wilson closes his book with ques-
tions about the fate of republican institutions in the context of
"that new semi-sovereign force known as the Global Mar-
ket."'57 But he also gives a last glance backwards, asking:
Have the "other" Americans-the Native, and Latin
Americans-benefited from this history, which at least
immunized them from significant European intervention?
They have certainly felt the wrath of a Machiavellian re-
public, which treats its citizens with some degree of re-
spect but sees the rest of the world as a source of exploita-
tion. In terms of actual policy, for well over a century the
United States has been far more concerned to make the
world safe for America and its corporations than for de-
mocracy. American leaders generally have favored "sta-
ble" dictatorships to turbulent democracies ....158
The point of all this is not to "bash" America. Wilson con-
cludes, "[t]he United States' overall imperial history has been
rather ordinary for an empire, not exceptionally evil or
virtuous.""' He also finds that the "evolution from subordi-
nate colonies of England to a political constitution that grants
formal equality throughout almost all its borders and pro-
vides basic citizenship rights to all adults is truly admira-
ble.",' 6  But history, even if written by the victors, must be
written with some objectivity-and the object cannot be seen
accurately through rose-colored glasses or the lens of nation-
alism. James G. Wilson is a revisionist only in the sense that
most historians, in regarding our history as an empire, have
viewed the subject while wearing blinders.
155. See id. at 252.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 258.
158. WILSON, supra note 1, at 255.
159. Id. at 257.
160. Id.
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